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Essay: Faculty, the Courts, and the First
Amendment
Neal H. Hutchens, Frank Fernandez, & Azalea
Hulbert*
I. INTRODUCTION
The period from approximately 1945 to 1970 represented a time of
unprecedented expansion in U.S. higher education.' It also marked the
professional ascendency of college and university faculty, of an "academic
revolution" as characterized by Christopher Jencks and David Riesman.'
Contemporary faculty, however, face the unraveling of this academic
revolution. A key trend involves a shift away from tenure-stream
appointments and growing reliance on non-tenure-track faculty, including
part-time adjuncts, now often referred to as the new faculty majority.3
With many faculty increasingly lacking the protections of tenure,
questions and debate abound over the future prospects of faculty
independence and academic freedom. Issues related to faculty speech and
academic freedom also entail a constitutional dimension-one especially
relevant for public higher education faculty-that provides the focus for
this article. Akin to the unclear prospects for tenure, First Amendment
protection for faculty speech, including that related to research and
teaching, faces an uncertain and contested future.
Despite periodic lofty rhetoric from the U.S. Supreme Court, First
Amendment protection for faculty academic freedom-for professors'
professionally-based speech in general-represents something of a
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1. See JOHN R. THELIN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 260-316 (2d
ed. 2011).
2. See generally CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & DAvID RIESMAN, THE ACADEMIC
REVOLUTION (1968).
3. See, e.g., NEW FACULTY MAJORITY, http://www.newfacultymajority.info (last
visited July 12, 2016).
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constitutional morass.4  Some commentators and courts contend that
public college and university faculty possess no First Amendment speech
rights except those afforded to any other public employees.5 Alternatively,
the argument goes that if any special constitutional protection exists for
academic freedom, it accrues only to institutions and not to individual
scholars.6
Legal debates over faculty speech and the First Amendment entered
a new phase with the 2006 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Garcetti
v. Ceballos.' While not a case involving professorial speech, Garcetti
proved potentially significant to faculty because it brought to the fore
problems associated with relying on the First Amendment speech rights of
public employees in general in the context of faculty speech. Before
Garcetti, in public employee speech cases, courts followed an inquiry that
largely turned on whether a public employee's speech constituted a matter
of public or private concern.8 Speech determined to address an issue of
public concern qualified for First Amendment protection, absent a
sufficient countervailing justification by the employer to restrict the
speech. In Garcetti, the Supreme Court introduced an additional stage in
the inquiry. Now, courts must consider whether the public employee's
speech in question took place pursuant to the carrying out of official
employment duties. If a public employee's speech occurred as part of
carrying out such official duties, then it does not qualify for First
Amendment protection under Garcetti.9
Dissenting in Garcetti, now retired Justice David Souter raised
concerns over the extension of the official duties requirement to public
higher education faculty."° He warned that doing so seemingly eliminated
First Amendment protection for multiple instances of faculty speech,
notably in areas related to scholarship and teaching. 1 The justices in the
majority responded that Justice Souter raised a potentially salient issue,
4. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 62 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 411-15 (4th Cir. 2000); Scott R.
Bauries, Individual Academic Freedom: An Ordinary Concern of the First Amendment, 83
MISS. L.J. 677, 679 (2014) ("[T]he Supreme Court has never recognized academic freedom
as a unique or 'special' individual right under the First Amendment that inheres only in
academics.").
6 See, e.g, [rofnv, 216 F 3d at 412 ("The Supreme Court, to the extent it has
constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized only an
institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs.").
7. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
8. See generally Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
9. Garcetti, 547 U.S at 421.
10. Id. at 438-39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
11. Id.
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but not one before the Court.12 Since then, legal decisions reflect
disagreement among courts regarding the applicability of the Garcetti
official duties standard to public higher education faculty.3
Garcetti initiated a new chapter in longstanding debate and
uncertainty over the First Amendment and faculty speech. Along with
providing context regarding ongoing issues related to faculty speech and
the First Amendment in Parts II and HI, this essay examines post-Garcetti
cases involving professorial speech in Part IV. A survey of these post-
Garcetti legal decisions reveals disparate responses by courts over how to
apply First Amendment standards in the realm of professionally-based
faculty speech. Following discussion of post-Garcetti cases implicating
faculty speech, the authors contend in Part V that compelling reasons exist
to provide First Amendment protection for faculty speech made pursuant
to the carrying out of professional duties (e.g., teaching, research, and
institutional service). In this section, and following the lead provided by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Demers v. Austin,14 the
authors also contend that the concept of public concern provides a
workable legal standard to evaluate faculty speech claims when
appropriately calibrated to a collegiate setting.
II. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND FACULTY ACADEMIC FREEDOM
For most of the history of American higher education, faculty
members were not considered to be autonomous professionals, and they
did not have job security or speech rights that were protected by tenure or
the First Amendment.15 For several centuries, American colleges had
small enrollments and educated students in religious and classical
curricula. After the Civil War, Americans were inspired by the German
model of research-oriented universities.16 Post-bellum college and
university presidents sought to build institutions that would produce
knowledge, and they came to see faculty members not only as teachers,
but also as expert researchers.17 American universities began awarding
PhDs in the late nineteenth century, and the doctorate became a more
popular credential for certifying faculty members as experts in their fields.
In the late 1800s, professors also banded together to create disciplinary
12. Id. at 425.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014). For a discussion of Demers, see
infra Parts IV, V.
15. See generally TIMOTHY REESE CAINE, ESTABLISHING ACADEMIC FREEDOM:
POLITICS, PRINCIPLES, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORE VALUES (2012).
16. Id. at 12-13.
17. See generally CAINE, supra note 15; ROGER L. GEIGER, To ADVANCE
KNOWLEDGE: THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES (2009).
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associations and academic journals to facilitate the review and
dissemination of new knowledge. Together, these changes formed the
basis for faculty members to work as professionals. However, even as the
professoriate became more professionalized, individual faculty members
were still subject to arbitrary dismissal at the whims of strong university
presidents and influential trustees or alumni.'8
Early in the 20th century, professors at some of the nation's leading
universities founded the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP), as a means to advocate for (a) the professionalization of faculty
work; (b) faculty autonomy from overzealous presidents and trustees; and
(c) some measure of job security.19 The organization published a
Declaration of Principles in its founding year, which introduced the idea
of academic freedom and argued that it should be a ubiquitous professional
norm in American higher education.2' The authors of the Declaration
contended that professors were more akin to "appointees" as opposed to
"employees ... in any proper sense.",21 The AAUP's conception of the
nature of faculty work built on ideas that were previously espoused by
disciplinary associations; those associations argued that faculty members
were hired to their positions in public trust-something that was distinct
from the typical dynamic between employers and employees.22 Walter
Metzger explained that the AAUP understood that the "expressional
freedoms of academics" were necessary for universities to meet their
public missions of increasing "the sum of human knowledge and
furnish[ing] experts for public service-new functions that had been
added to the time-honored one of qualifying students for degrees.'"23
Building on the ideas articulated in the 1915 Declaration of
Principles, in 1940, the AAUP published a Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure, which expanded on the notions that
faculty should have professional autonomy and academic free speech
rights.24 The AAUP secured the cooperation of the American Association
of Colleges (AAC) in producing its 1940 Statement,25 which meant that
the Statement had support from national organizations representing both
18. CAINE, supra note 15, at 12-28.
19. Id. at 34.
20. Id. at 38-41.
21. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 1915 Declaration of
Principles on Arademic Freedom and Academic Tenure. in AAIIP- PoTitCY DOCUMENTS
AND REPORTS 3, 6 (11th ed. 2015).
22. See generally Robert P. Ludlum, Academic Freedom and Tenure: A History, 10
ANTIOCH REV 3 (1950).
23. Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 13 (1990).
24. Id. at3.
25. Id. at 12.
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faculty and institutional interests. Together, the AAUP and AAC argued
that faculty members were simultaneously "citizens, members of a learned
profession, and officers of an educational institution.',26 Moreover, the
1940 Statement outlined three pillars of academic freedom and
professional autonomy including the freedom to pursue and publish
research, freedom over instruction, and freedom to publicly communicate
as citizens of a democratic society.27
Tenure, and its protections of employment security, would serve as
the dominant mechanism for realizing the aims espoused in the 1915
Declaration and 1940 Statement. Following the years after World War II,
American higher education underwent a significant expansion.2' The era
also marked the widespread adoption of tenure and the assumption of a
prime role for faculty in institutional affairs, particularly the curriculum,
under principles of shared governance.2 9
Today, the academic revolution increasingly faces an unraveling in
which the professional arrangement-tenure- arrived at to secure faculty
academic freedom and independence applies increasingly to a shrinking
slice of the professoriate. Currently, only around a quarter of higher
education instructors occupy tenure-stream appointments, while around
half of faculty are in part-time adjunct positions.3" Another group of the
professoriate holds full-time positions with varying appointment
arrangements, with some individuals employed on a yearly basis and
others on multi-year appointments with more substantial employment
protections.3 1 The erosion of tenure-stream faculty appointments provides
important context to our examination of professors' First Amendment
rights for their professionally-based speech. Simply put, if not tenure, then
what other legally enforceable mechanisms are available to faculty in
carrying out their professional roles as teachers, researchers, and
participants in institutional governance and administrative matters?
32
26. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments, in AAUP:
POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS, supra note 21, at 13, 14.
27. Id.
28. THELIN, supra note 1, at 260-316.
29. See generally Metzger, supra note 23.
30. John Barnshaw, Status of the Academic Labor Force, 2013, AAUP (Mar. 2015),
http://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/Status-2013.pdf.
31. Id.
32. While not the focus of this article, collective bargaining has played an important
role for non-tenure-track faculty seeking employment protections and improved
compensation. See generally, e.g., Neal H. Hutchens, Using a Legal Lens to Better
Understand and Frame Issues Shaping the Employment Environment of Non-Tenure Track
Faculty Members, 55 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1443 (2011).
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III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FACULTY SPEECH
Judges and scholars did not conceive of academic freedom as a
constitutional concept until after it came to be viewed as a professional
norm-protected through tenure-in American higher education.
Academic freedom became viewed as possessing a constitutional
dimension during the Cold War era, when McCarthyism inspired
government officials to inject themselves in public education for the
purpose of identifying and expelling communist sympathizers.33 In this
climate, academic freedom first received attention in a Supreme Court
dissenting opinion in Adler v. Board of Education.34 The case dealt with
the dismissal of a New York City school teacher, Irving Adler, under a
state law that prohibited employment in public education by individuals
belonging to organizations deemed subversive.35 The Supreme Court
upheld the law in Adler, but Justice William 0. Douglas argued in dissent
that this law represented a threat to academic freedom, which must be
protected in the nation's schools.36 He contended that he law at issue
threatened to turn "the school system into a spying project" and subverted
the First Amendment purposes of promoting free inquiry and preventing
censorship.37
A well-known concurring opinion in 1957 in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire38 added an important contribution to recognition of a First
Amendment dimension to academic freedom. The case dealt with the
economist Paul Sweezy refusing to answer questions that the New
Hampshire Attorney General's office posed about his activities, including
his lectures at the University of New Hampshire and his scholarly
activities.3 9 Indicative of pushback against the excesses of McCarthyism,
the Supreme Court determined that holding the individual in contempt for
refusing to answer questions under the circumstances violated due process
protections.4 ° Justice Felix Frankfurter, in a separate opinion agreeing
with the judgment, quoted from a group of South African scholars for the
proposition that colleges and universities should possess the authority to
decide "who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and
who may be admitted to study."
41
33. Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the
Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REv. 125,
132 (2009).
34. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
35. Id. at 488-89.
36. Id. at 508.
37. Id. at 509.
38. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
39. Id. at 238-39.
40. Id. at 254-55.
41. Id. at263.
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In Keyishian v. Board ofRegents of University of State ofNew York,4 2
the Supreme Court struck down New York's loyalty provision for
educators previously upheld in Adler.43 Writing for the majority, Justice
William Brennan declared that the United States was "deeply committed
to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of
us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That [academic] freedom is
therefore a special concern [italics added] of the First Amendment .... "'
Despite this seemingly strong judicial endorsement of First Amendment
protection for academic freedom, later precedent failed to produce a
coherent legal framework to delineate First Amendment academic
freedom protections for faculty.45
In current constitutional academic freedom debates, some
commentators contend public college and university faculty possess no
First Amendment speech rights beyond those afforded to any other public
employees, while others advocate that specific constitutional protections
exist for at least some forms of professorial speech and expression. A
cause and symptom of this legal uncertainty stem from a failure by courts
to articulate a set of legal standards based on a constitutional conception
of academic freedom to adjudicate faculty speech claims. Instead, legal
standards governing the speech rights of public employees in general have
provided the dominant legal framework when public higher education
faculty assert First Amendment speech and academic freedom claims
against their institutions.'
The contrasting opinions in Emergency Coalition to Defend
Educational Travel v. U.S. Department of Treasury47 illustrate competing
judicial notions over how to interpret faculty speech rights in relation to
constitutional academic freedom concerns. The case centers on the federal
government's authority to impose restrictions on academic study programs
in Cuba.48 Several claimants challenged the restrictions as a violation of
individual academic freedom rights.49 As such, the case raised questions
regarding the contours of academic freedom as a constitutionally protected
right in a post-Garcetti context.
In response to constitutional academic freedom arguments, the
federal government contended that "even if there is a component of the
42. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
43. Id. at 605.
44. Id. at 603.
45. See, e.g., Tepper & White, supra note 33, at 132; Lawrence White, Fifty Years of
Academic Freedom Jurisprudence, 36 J.C. & U.L. 791, 792-93 (2010).
46. See generally Tepper & White, supra note 33.
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First Amendment that protects academic freedom-separate and apart
from the Amendment's coverage of free speech-it is a right that inheres
in the universities, not individual professors."5 The judges hearing the
case concluded that the restriction was permissible as a content-neutral
regulation, thus not requiring the court to address directly the
constitutional academic freedom issue in the opinion representing the
judgment of the court.1
Two judges participating as part of the panel deciding the case
authored concurring opinions in which they sought to elaborate on issues
related to faculty academic freedom and the First Amendment. One of
these judges stated that academic freedom "has generally been understood
to protect and foster the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas
among teacher and students and the serious pursuit of scholarship among
members of the academy."52  Additionally, and looking to an article
written by legal scholar Judith Areen,53 the judge noted that academic
freedom potentially involved a shared governance dimension as well.54
Thus, the judge took the position that along with teaching and scholarship,
constitutional academic freedom for individual faculty ostensibly included
the right to speak on "academic matters" such as "student academic
standards."55
The other concurring opinion in Emergency Coalition provided a
fundamentally different view of the First Amendment and academic
freedom. The judge stated that uncertainty existed over whether any
additional First Amendment protections exist for academic freedom
beyond those generally afforded to any claimants asserting constitutional
speech rights.6 Furthermore, contended the judge, "it is doubtful that a
professor could assert an individual constitutional right of academic
freedom against his university employer, whether state or private."57
Rather than decided on distinct academic freedom grounds, the judge
interpreted cases such as Sweezy and Keyishian as determined on the basis
of constitutional protections generally applicable to speech.58 Echoing the
sentiment contained in several of the other post-Garcetti opinions
50. Id. at 12. Alternatively, the government argued that even if an individual
academic freedom right existed, the travel restriction did not interfere with it. Id.
51. Id. at 12-14.
52. Id. at 15.
53. Judith C. Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945 (2009).
When discussed in the opinion, the article was forthcoming. Emergency CoaL, 545 F.3d at
15.
54. Emergency CoaL, 545 F.3d at 15.
55. Id. at 16.
56. Id. at 19-20.
57. Id. at 18.
58. Id. at 18-19.
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discussed in this essay, the judge contended that the "state can be said to
'speak' through its employees.59 According to the judge, this view of
employee speech "suggests that the Government may well be correct in
asserting that academic freedom-if indeed it is a First Amendment
concept warranting separate protection-inheres in the university, not in
individual professors."6
In summary, judicial reliance on public employee standards to decide
faculty speech claims became even more problematic with the Garcetti
decision. In Garcetti, the Supreme Court introduced an additional step in
the public employee speech inquiry, one in which courts must consider
whether the speech at issue took place pursuant o the performance of
official employment duties.6' As noted, Justice Souter's dissent in
Garcetti raised concerns that application of this requirement o faculty in
public higher education would eliminate important First Amendment
protections for many forms of professorial speech, including in the areas
of teaching and scholarship.62 The case initiated a new chapter in
longstanding scholarly and judicial discourse over the extent of First
Amendment speech rights for faculty in carrying out their professional
roles. As discussed in the next section, some courts have interpreted
Garcetti as extending to professorial speech made as a part of carrying out
official duties. In contrast, other courts have resisted its application to at
least certain types of faculty speech.
IV. CONFLICTING RESPONSES BY COURTS IN POST-GARCETI FACULTY
CASES
A. Faculty as Institutional Mouthpieces under Garcetti
In multiple post-Garcetti cases, courts determined that public higher
education faculty do not carry out professional roles distinctive from any
other public employees for First Amendment purposes. Under this
interpretive approach, faculty serve as speech conduits for their
institutions in the fulfillment of employment rather than engaging in
independent speech potentially eligible for constitutional protection.
Often, judicial interpretations also cast faculty service and administrative
work as distinct from teaching or scholarship, thus strengthening the
justification to treat faculty speech, at least in some contexts, as similar to
that of other public employees.
59. Id. at 19.
60. Id.
61. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
62. Id. at 438-39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1035
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In one illustrative case, Gorum v. Sessoms,63 a professor claimed that
he suffered retaliation for assisting a student in a disciplinary hearing and
for revoking an invitation to the university's president to speak at a campus
event.6' A federal appeals court and district court both concluded that the
intramural speech-or speech made internal to campus-at issue in both
instances entailed the faculty member carrying out official employment
duties subject o the Garcetti standards.65 The appeals court did entertain
the idea that speech implicating scholarship or teaching might not be
subject to the Garcetti standards, but stated in its opinion that such speech
was not under consideration in the case.66
In another representative decision, Hong v. Grant,67 a faculty member
asserted that he was subjected to retaliation for making comments critical
of the use of adjuncts and for offering a negative evaluation of a colleague
in a promotion and tenure context.68 A federal district court held that
because the speech occurred in the course of the professor carrying out his
employment duties it failed to qualify for First Amendment protection
based on Garcetti.69  As such, the university could "regulate [the]
statements ... without judicial interference.7° Similar to aspects of the
decision in Hong, in Miller v. University of South Alabama,71 an assistant
professor (Miller) claimed that her nonrenewal to a tenure-track faculty
appointment stemmed from her criticism of a hiring committee on which
she served for failing to adequately consider diversity-related factors in
assembling a candidate list.72  For the court, the veracity of Miller's
assertions did not matter for its analysis.7 3 Instead, the dispositive issue
turned on the fact that the speech arose from Miller's participation as a
member of the hiring committee. Serving on such committees, according
to the court, constituted an official employment duty for Miller, which
made the speech ineligible for First Amendment protection under
Garcetti.
74
63. Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009).
64. Id. at 183-84.
65. Id. at 184-86, 188.
66. Id. at 186.
67. Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007), aff'd, 403 F. App'x 236
(9th Cir. 2010).
68. Id. at 1160, 1162-64.
69. Id. at 1168.
70. Id. at 1167-68.
71. Miller v. Univ. of S. Ala., No. 09-0146-KD-B, 2010 WL 1994910 (S.D. Ala. May
17, 2010).
72. Id. at*1.
73. Id. at *10.
74. Id. at *10-11.
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In another case, Huang v. Rector and Visitors of University of
Virginia,75 a faculty member contended that he suffered retaliation for
speaking out against the misappropriation of grant funds.76 The court
determined that the speech dealt with matters involving his official
employment duties, thus making it ineligible for First Amendment
protection." In a similar case involving faculty speech connected to the
administration of a grant, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed a federal district court's determination that such speech fell under
the auspices of official duties and did not receive First Amendment
protection based on Garcetti.78  A federal district court arrived at a
comparable conclusion in a case involving a clinical veterinarian
employed in a faculty research position who alleged that she was retaliated
against for expressing concerns about animal treatment.79  The court
determined that the clinical veterinarian spoke on matters dealing with er
official employment duties, thus excluding the possibility of First
Amendment protection for the speech.80
When Justice Souter dissented from the majority opinion in Garcetti,
he questioned whether the new public employee speech standards might
be applied to higher education faculty teaching and research.8" Justice
Souter's concerns were not unfounded. Since Garcetti, several lower
courts have concluded that faculty members' speech in the arenas of
scholarship and instruction should not be subject to First Amendment
protections-although the lower court decisions were later reversed by
superior courts as discussed in Part IV-B. In one of these cases, Demers
v. Austin, a federal district court determined that a proposal (the "Plan")
written by a professor to reorganize journalism education at Washington
State University fell under the Garcetti standards.82 According to the
court, the professor "was not speaking as a citizen when he initially
presented the Plan to his fellow faculty members and to the university
administration."83  Instead, the court determined that the professor
75. Huang v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 896 F. Supp. 2d 524 (W.D. Va.
2012).
76. Id. at 529.
77. Id. at 543.
78. Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773-74 (7th Cir. 2008).
79. Hrapkiewicz v. Bd. of Governors of Wayne State Univ., No. 11-13418,2012 WL
393133, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2012).
80. Id. at *8.
81. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 438-39 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
82. Demers v. Austin, No. CV-09-334-RHW, 2011 WL 2182100 (E.D. Wash. June
2, 2011). See infra Part TV-B for discussion of the Ninth Circuit's decision overturning the
district court's decision.
83. Id. at *4. Alternatively, the court determined the speech at issue did not address a
matter of public concern. Id.
1037
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prepared the publication as part of carrying out his official duties.84
Furthermore, these "official duties are not limited to classroom instruction
and research. Faculty members are expected to participate in a wide range
of academic, administrative, and personnel functions. '85 Thus, the federal
district court sought to implement a broad interpretation of official duties
in relation to public higher education faculty, one that emphasized
managerial authority and control over professional autonomy.
Along with the plan to reorganize journalism education, the federal
district court in Demers also considered First Amendment claims related
to a writing project undertaken by the faculty member while on
sabbatical.86 The court decided that this work too was subject to
Garcetti.87 It noted in its opinion that the faculty member listed the work-
in-progress in faculty performance reviews. According to the court, the
"book does not represent speech made by a private citizen; rather the book
represents speech made in the course of Plaintiffs employment as a
college professor."
88
Another case with a scholarship facet, Adams v. Trustees of the
University of North Carolina- Wilmington,89 centered on items submitted
by a tenured faculty member for promotion to full professor.9° The
professor claimed that he was denied promotion because of bias against
him over conservative political and religious views he had expressed in
these materials.91 A federal district court held that "columns, publications,
and presentations" submitted by the professor "constituted-in the context
of the promotion evaluation-expressions made pursuant to plaintiffs
professional duties," which excluded them from First Amendment
protection.92 The decision is notable in clearly designating speech held
out as pertaining to scholarship as within the purview of the Garcetti
standards.
The opinions discussed in this part reflected a judicial interpretation
of faculty speech made as part of carrying out professional responsibilities
as subject to managerial authority for First Amendment considerations.
Rather than conceptualizing faculty as independent voices in such






89. Adams v. Trs. of Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, No. 7:07-CV-64-H, 2010 WL
10991020 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 15, 2010). See infra Part IV-B for discussion of the Fourth
Circuit's decision overturning the district court's decision.
90. Id. at *4-9.
91. Id. at *1.
92. Id. at *14.
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public employees in terms of the First Amendment. Notably, even though
reversed on appeal, the lower court opinions in Demers v. Austin and
Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina- Wilmington sought
to extend such managerial authority to faculty speech dealing with
teaching and scholarship. The judges who wrote the Demers and Adams
opinions concluded that institutions of higher education were "owning"
speech made by faculty members who were performing their professional
job duties such as advising students, developing course content, publishing
scholarly work, participating in university governance, and writing for
public media. Thus, some courts interpret faculty to serve as speech
conduits of their institutions from a First Amendment perspective.
B. Faculty as Independent Speakers under First Amendment Despite
Garcetti
In contrast to the lower court opinions in cases such as Demers and
Adams, other judges have determined that faculty members possess First
Amendment protections for speech they make in the course of completing
their work. Courts that ruled in favor of academic freedom did so, in part,
because they found that when professors carry out their professional
responsibilities they fulfill important social and institutional roles. In a
prominent opinion, Demers v. Austin, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, reversed the district court decision discussed in Part IV-A
and reached a fundamentally different conclusion about the nature of
faculty speech rights.93 The case involved ajournalism professor, Demers,
at Washington State University who claimed that he was subjected to
retaliation on the basis of two forms of communication.94 One dealt with
a plan proposed by Demers that called for the reorganization ofjournalism
education at the university.95 The other involved an in-progress book,
which Demers worked on during a sabbatical.96 According to the Ninth
Circuit, the Demers case presented exactly the kind of scenario that
"worried" Justice Souter in his Garcetti dissent.97 The court determined
that an exception existed for teaching and scholarship under Garcetti that
applied to the curricular plan proposed by Demers.9" The Ninth Circuit
described "teaching and academic writing" as constituting core faculty
duties and meriting First Amendment protection.99 The court stated: "[w]e
93. Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014).
94. Id. at 406.
95. Id. at 406-407.
96. Id. at 408.
97. Id. at 411.
98. Id. at 406. The court determined that there existed insufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the proposed book resulted in retaliation. Id.
99. Id.
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conclude that if applied to teaching and academic writing, Garcetti would
directly conflict with the important First Amendment values previously
articulated by the Supreme Court."''0
As with Demers, in Adams v. Trustees of the University of North
Carolina- Wilmington,10 1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
also reached a much different interpretation of faculty rights than that
reached by the lower court. While the court decided in favor of the faculty
member on a more limited basis than the Ninth Circuit in Demers, it
articulated that restrictions should exist on institutional authority to
regulate faculty speech.102 The Fourth Circuit determined that the faculty
member's inclusion of materials in a promotion dossier did not
automatically divest them of First Amendment protection.'03 It held that
since the professor was not explicitly required to undertake the writings
under review, their inclusion in promotion materials did not transform
them into speech made pursuant to official duties and subject to
Garcetti.1°' While this decision represented a less far-reaching
interpretation of faculty autonomy under the First Amendment than in
Demers, the Adams court decided that, at least in certain instances, faculty
speech and expression, even if generally fulfilling the duties expected of
professors, did not automatically become subject to managerial control.
In two cases, federal courts excluded teaching-related speech from
the reach of Garcetti. In one case, Kerr v. Hurd,1"5 a medical school
faculty member specializing in obstetrics and gynecology claimed that he
was retaliated against for advocating in his teaching a certain childbirth
procedure.106 A medical school official named as a party in the lawsuit
claimed that the professor failed to engage in First Amendment protected
speech based on Garcetti.'07 Rejecting this argument and finding the
speech protected, the court discussed that the Supreme Court explicitly
noted in Garcetti that the standards might not apply to faculty speech.10 8
Additionally, it stated that an "academic freedom exception" should exist
in relation to Garcetti to protect "the active trading floors in the
marketplace of ideas."1 9 According to the court, the views expressed by
100. Id.
101. Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011).
102. Id. at 560-64.
103. Id. at 565-66.
104. Id. at 562-63.
105. Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
106. Id. at 828, 834-35.
107. Id. at 843.
108. Id. at 843-44.
109. Id. at 844,
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the faculty member fell "well within the range of accepted medical
opinion" and were thus deserving of First Amendment protection.11
In another case involving speech arising in an instructional setting,
Sheldon v. Dhillon, "' an adjunct instructor in a course on human heredity
alleged that she suffered retaliation based on the answer she gave to a
student regarding connections between sexual orientation and heredity. 112
In its legal response to these allegations, the community college contended
that the professor's speech fell under the Garcetti standards, thereby
negating any viable First Amendment claim.' 3
Sheldon is important as it reflects a court's refusal to apply the
Garcetti standards, but it also illustrates continuing ambiguity over the
appropriate legal standards to assess faculty speech claims. Instead of
looking to the academic freedom decisions or the public employee speech
cases, the Sheldon court discussed that cases in the Ninth Circuit relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier"4 when assessing speech claims involving instructional
speech. Rather than an academic freedom case arising in higher education,
Hazelwood involved a group of secondary students claiming First
Amendment rights in relation to a student newspaper produced as part of
a journalism class."5 Thus, while not applying the Garcetti standards to
the biology instructor's speech, the Sheldon case highlights how academic
freedom cases have not resulted in consistent legal criteria for speech
claims involving faculty, even among courts sympathetic to First
Amendment protection for professorial speech. The legal standards
applied in Sheldon came from precedent involving secondary students and
also made no distinction between elementary and secondary teachers and
faculty members in higher education.
V. THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF
PROFESSIONALLY-BASED FACULTY SPEECH
In Urofsky v. Gilmore the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that public higher education faculty
possess no other First Amendment rights for their professionally-based
speech than those generally available to other public employees."6 This
determination, while potentially sensible at a cursory level (i.e., the idea
110. Id.
111. Sheldon v. Dhillon, No. C-08-03438 RMW, 2009 WL 4282086 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
25, 2009).
112. Id. at *1-2.
113. Id. at *3.
114. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. KuhImeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
115. Id. at 262-64.
116. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000).
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of not carving out special exceptions for classes of individuals under the
First Amendment), falls apart under more careful scrutiny. One
justification1 7 to ground these First Amendment rights is to focus on how
voluntary actions by public colleges and universities-such as adoption of
academic freedom policies- in defining faculty roles and autonomy
should serve to permit constitutional protection for faculty speech made
pursuant to carrying out professional duties. That is, institutional actions
regarding how to define faculty roles and independence in intellectual nd
service matters should result in First Amendment rights for faculty speech
made as part of carrying out professional duties.
The Supreme Court has recognized that some kinds of speech
obligations undertaken by colleges and universities in the student speech
realm trigger First Amendment protection for such speech, even if an
institution was not otherwise required by the First Amendment o support
such speech or expressive activity. Such has been the case in the context
of officially recognized student groups118 and student publications.1 19 The
First Amendment does not require public colleges and universities to have
officially recognized student groups or to subsidize independent student
publications, but, as these cases have shown, once an institution opts to do
so, it must exercise viewpoint neutrality in the rules placed on such groups
or publications.
While the issue of faculty professional speech differs from student
groups in important respects and applicable First Amendment tests, the
shared principle relates to the fact that voluntary action on the part of a
college or university can result in institutional First Amendment
obligations. Once an institution elects to empower faculty to engage in
independent speech for purposes of carrying out their professional roles, it
should not, under the First Amendment, then be able to renege on that
grant of professional independence based on the public employee speech
cases. Importantly, this is not a view of First Amendment employee
speech rights necessarily limited only to faculty, as it could form a basis
to extend professionally-based speech rights to other classes of public
employees explicitly authorized by their employer to exercise
independence in their speech and professional pronouncements, or
required to do so by law. Simply put, if a public college or university
117. Other justifications certainly exist, and the authors are not foreclosing these other
possibilities in making the arguments presented in this relatively brief essay.
118. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 223 (2000)
(holding that a university may operate a mandatory fee system to subsidize student
organizations if such fees are distributed in a viewpoint neutral manner).
119. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-33
(1995) (determining the standards of viewpoint neutrality applicable to a university system
of funding independent student publications).
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chooses to authorize explicitly a set of employees (i.e., professors) to
exercise independence in their professional speech, then such voluntary
institutional acknowledgement and endorsement of freedom of speech
should have First Amendment consequences in relation to how courts
apply the public employee speech standards to faculty speech under such
circumstances.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that First Amendment
standards should be adjusted when appropriate to account for the
collegiate setting. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin v.
Southworth dealt with the imposition of a mandatory fee program by a
university to support the activities of student organizations.2 ' Challengers
to the program looked to cases involving collection of dues in union
contexts where courts had held that use of required fees to further political
speech by the unions constituted impermissible compelled speech under
the First Amendment.2' In Southworth, the Supreme Court discussed the
different considerations present in a higher education setting in applying
constitutional standards governing compelled speech.'22 As such, unlike
the issue of compelled speech in a union context, the university could
impose the mandatory fee to support student organizations representing a
variety of viewpoints, even if students found the views or activities of
particular groups offensive. In a similar fashion, different First
Amendment considerations should apply in collegiate contexts when it
comes to faculty speech, especially when considered alongside the
proactive steps taken by institutions to espouse support for faculty
independence-notably the adoption of AAUP standards of academic
freedom-that reflect principles not applied by most other public
employers to their employees' work-related speech.
In terms of First Amendment analysis, public colleges and
universities should not be allowed to have it both ways when it comes to
their faculty. Adopting and holding out academic freedom statements but
then attempting to rely on Garcetti when faculty exercise this
institutionally backed independence is incongruous. Taking into
consideration institutional actions and policies dealing with faculty speech
and autonomy does not preclude other theories on which to base First
Amendment protection for faculty speech. At the same time, it permits
voluntary institutional recognition of faculty speech rights to be taken into
account for First Amendment analysis under the public employee speech
standards. Courts should give the appropriate recognition to and
120. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 221.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 230 (stating previous cases involving compelled speech in union contexts
"neither applicable nor workable in the context of extracurricular student speech at a
university").
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consideration of such academic freedom standards and policies in
determining faculty First Amendment rights for their professionally-based
speech.
Colleges and universities hire faculty on the premise that they will
offer independent views and expertise rather than simply serve as
institutional spokespersons. These expectations shift (or they should) the
First Amendment analysis otherwise applied to public employees. In sum,
courts should take seriously the intellectual freedom commitments made
by colleges and universities when interpreting faculty First Amendment
speech rights.
Adjustment to the public employee speech standards to account for
institutions authorizing faculty to engage in independent professionally-
based speech would not leave courts without a workable legal test to
evaluate professorial speech claims. The tests already applied to employee
speech present a pragmatic, ready alternative if appropriately calibrated to
the collegiate setting. As discussed, under the public employee speech
standards, a public employer may still offer a sufficient justification to
restrict otherwise protected speech. Established professional standards
and norms in higher education prove instructive in charting the types of
institutional interests at play to appropriately regulate faculty speech in
particular instances.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Demers v. Austin
demonstrated perhaps the most nuanced approach thus far among courts
in terms of seeking to align the public employee speech standards with the
idea of academic freedom as a constitutional concern. In Demers, the
Ninth Circuit decided that academic and teaching-related writing qualified
for First Amendment protection. 123 In making this determination, the court
looked for support to the Supreme Court's academic freedom precedent.
124
But, in operationalizing the available constitutional protection for faculty
speech, it turned more specifically to the public employee speech cases as
providing the legal framework to evaluate faculty speech claims in such
circumstances.1
25
Under these standards, speech by a public employee must address a
matter of public concern to qualify for First Amendment protection. Still,
the court discussed that unique circumstances encompass the idea of
public concern in a college or university, meaning that the "balancing
process in cases involving academic speech is likely to be particularly
subtle and 'difficult."' 126 This judicial stance is markedly different than
123. Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 2014).
124. Id. at 411-12.
125. Id. at 412.
126. Id. at 413.
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that taken by courts in several cases discussed in Part IV-A where courts
used a more generalized conception of public concern as a basis to curtail
First Amendment speech rights for faculty. The appeals court in Demers
rejected a generic notion of public concern as inappropriate to a higher
education context. To illustrate, the court discussed that debates in an
English department over a literary canon might appear "trivial to some,"
but that such a view fails to take into account the "importance to our
culture not only of the study of literature, but also of the choice of the
literature to be studied."'127 Similar circumstances, noted the court, could
exist in other disciplines. It cautioned against judges being too quick to
disregard such academic considerations: "[r]ecognizing our limitations as
judges, we should hesitate before concluding that academic disagreements
about what may appear to be esoteric topics are mere squabbles over jobs,
turf, or ego.'
'1 28
In general, courts could tailor the public employee speech standards
to a higher education context. In applying the concept of public concern
in a manner appropriate to a college or university, courts could take into
account the legitimate interests of institutions to restrict faculty speech at
certain points, such as ensuring that a professor demonstrates competency
in her or his subject area. Recognition of faculty First Amendment rights
would not leave colleges and universities without recourse to restrict
professorial speech in some (appropriate) instances, but it would take away
unfettered institutional authority to regulate professionally-based faculty
speech-at least in terms of the First Amendment-in all instances based
on Garcetti.
VI. CONCLUSION-WHAT NEXT FOR FACULTY SPEECH?
While advocating for a continued First Amendment role for
safeguarding professionally-based faculty speech, the authors
acknowledge that limitations exist on any constitutional protections
afforded. The lack of tenure for increasing numbers of faculty raises
serious concerns regarding intellectual freedom in our nation's colleges
and universities. Alongside constitutional protections, a need exists for
other mechanisms, such as those provided through tenure or, alternatively,
long-term contracts or collective bargaining, to provide meaningful legal
protections for faculty autonomy and academic freedom. Rather than
some kind of welcome disruptive innovation to higher education, we
contend a lack of legal safeguards for faculty speech and independence
degrades the higher education enterprise in crucial ways. Instead of
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increasingly de-professionalize the faculty role, policymakers, elected
officials, courts, and institutional leaders should consider carefully the
costs to our students, institutions, and society of dismantling, as opposed
to revitalizing, faculty professional independence and academic freedom,
including through the First Amendment.
